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Lear argues that in the Nichomachean Ethics (NE hereafter) Aristotle advances a monistic rather than
inclusivist conception of happiness. According to the monistic conception, virtuous activity approximates
but is not equivalent to contemplative activity. According to the inclusivist conception, contemplative
activity includes virtuous activity because virtuous activity is choice-worthy for its own sake. In Lear’s
view, if one interprets NE in light of Aristotle’s conception of teleology as defended in his many works
on metaphysics, cosmology, physics and biology, the monistic conception of eudaimonia represents the
better of the two positions.
Lear’s argument in favor of the monistic conception of happiness rests on a treatment of many
familiar themes. The following is a partial list: the finality criterion, teleological relations of
approximation, virtues as goods with intrinsic value, and the role of practical and theoretical reason
in the happy life.
There are also some unfamiliar themes which play an important role in Lear’s argument. Perhaps
the best example is the emphasis Lear places on Aristotle’s work on metaphysics and physics. For
instance, Lear argues that in order to fully grasp the place of teleology in Aristotle’s ethics one
must appreciate the central place of teleology in Aristotle’s philosophical system. This interpretive
strategy, according to Lear, provides support for her claim that the “teleological relationship of
approximation” (p. 72) is central to understanding Aristotle’s ethics. As Lear puts it:
…I am not the first to suggest that approximation is one of the ways of acting for an end
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that Aristotle has in mind when he describes people as doing everything for the sake of
eudaimonia. But it has not played any significant role in the interpretation of how the
happy person could act for the sake of contemplative eudaimonia. Perhaps this is
because readers of the Nichomachean Ethics have not sufficiently recognized how
important this way of acting for an end is for Aristotle in other areas of his philosophy.
(p. 73)
This is a very interesting position. According to Lear, the conception of teleology that Aristotle
affirms in his work on metaphysics and natural philosophy can illuminate Aristotle’s position on the
role of the virtues in a happy life. For instance, in Aristotle’s cosmology the teleological
relationship of approximation explains why the “first heaven” is “moved by its desire to become as
much like the Prime Mover as it is possible for it to be.” (p. 80) The same teleological relationship
of approximation explains why, for Aristotle, the virtues are middle-level goods whose intrinsic
value comes from their relation to and approximation of contemplation. The virtues stand in a
teleological relationship of approximation to contemplation as a subordinate end whose value is
transmitted from the higher end of contemplation. (p. 87)
In Chapter Seven Lear offers an analysis of three Aristotlean virtues: temperance, courage, and
greatness of soul. Each virtue is interpreted by Lear in a way that construes them as middle-level
ends that approximate the ultimate end of contemplation. This position has some surprising
consequences. One is that “Aristotle’s virtues are fine because they point to the superior value of
the most perfect reasoning, which is contemplative.” (p. 147) This does not imply that the virtues
have instrumental value, for instance, as mere means to the end of contemplative activity. Rather,
virtuous action is choice-worthy for its own sake yet the intrinsic value and thus inherent choice-
worthiness of the virtues is explained by showing the connection between virtue and contemplation.
One might suspect that Lear is trying to have things both ways. On the one hand, contemplative
activity is affirmed as the highest good; contemplative activity is higher than virtuous activity
which stands in a subordinate yet teleological relationship of approximation to contemplative
activity. On the other hand, virtuous activity is said to be worth pursuing for its own sake. Can this
position coherently explain the choice-worthiness of virtuous action? Lear acknowledges that on its
face courage “provides a particularly difficult case” for her position. (p. 149). She tackles this
difficulty head on by arguing that “we cannot understand why courageous actions and their
circumstances are fine solely by reference to the magnitude of the threat they tackle.” (p. 150) This
is a claim that many will find counter intuitive. Isn’t courageous action courageous precisely
because and to the degree to which the agent faces a threat with a very high order of magnitude?
However, courageous activity, though choice-worthy for its own sake, is choice-worthy because of
the end it serves. And since the virtues are middle-level ends, there is nothing untoward about a
view which claims that courageous action is choice-worthy for its own sake and that virtuous action
is an approximation of contemplative activity. If Aristotle’s conception of teleological relations of
approximation threads together his conception of the relationship between virtuous and
contemplative activity, then Lear has got her hands on a compelling argument.
Read superficially, Lear’s argument might be thought to advance an interpretation of NE that is
hard to square with much of what Aristotle claims about the connection between the virtues and
eudaimonia. However, in Chapter Eight “Two Happy Lives and Their Most Final Ends” Lear
shows that the Aristotelean ideal is not that of an amoral superhero who entitles herself to a
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permanent moral holiday in order to attain a self-perfection unattainable within the constraints of
moral considerations. Each of the virtues, courage, temperance, etc. may be pursued for its own
sake. Moreover, virtuous action is simultaneously pursued for its own sake and for the sake of
contemplative activity. It is true that only contemplative activity qualifies as “our most final end,
the human good, and perfect or most final eudaimonia. The philosopher who devotes everything he
does to contemplation leads the happiest human life.” (p. 175) But this claim must be put into the
context of Aristotle’s own claim that “If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is
reasonable that it be in accordance with the best (virtue); and this would be (the virtue) of the best
part.” (NE, 1177a12-13, quoted on p. 181). Lear’s monistic conception can make sense of this
passage in a way the inclusivist conception cannot.
According to Lear, when Aristotle suggests the highest form of happiness is an activity in
accordance with virtue and that the activity which accords with the highest virtue is the highest
happiness, this does not imply that only the courageous, the temperate, etc. lead the best lives.
Rather, the best life is lived by the philosopher for whom contemplation is the final end. In making
contemplation one’s final end, one will have a proper concern for the virtues. The best life for
humans can only be achieved by agents who live in accordance with an arrangement of goods
including those which approximate the highest. Lear offers a clear summary of her position when
she writes:
We began by wondering how a life devoted entirely to the monistic good of
contemplation could be recognizable as a happy life in Aristotle’s sense, a life worth
choosing and admiring, a fully flourishing life lacking nothing. What place would such a
life have for proper moral concern? Aristotle’s answer is this: When we protect those we
love courageously, dine with them temperately, give to them generously, and accept the
honors with greatness of soul, we grasp the practical truth—we are embodied, political
animals who find our rational happiness only in common with others. Grasping this
practical truth approximates contemplation and is worth choosing for its sake. (p. 207)
Happy Lives and the Highest Good is an ambitious book. Lear defends a position that will strike
some as implausible. The monistic conception of eudaimonia seems to imply that the best form of
happiness fit for human perfection involves a god-likeness that is not identical to the life of a
morally virtuous person. Some will contest this interpretation. Is the courageous agent one for
whom the life of virtue is worth choosing because she understands that the practical truths of
morality approximate the theoretical truths of contemplation? Lear anticipates and responds to this
worry. First, Lear attempts to mount a case for her interpretation which is supported by a thorough
survey of the textual evidence. In her view, the evidence favors the monistic conception. Secondly,
Lear also attempts to resolve an apparent difficulty with her thesis. If the highest good is
contemplation and if contemplation is a theoretical activity, then why does Aristotle spend so much
time defending a view that looks like an ethics that identifies virtue with happiness? Lear rises to
the challenge of this difficult question by offering a detailed and systematic analysis of many
concepts and features of Aristotle’s position. For example, a significant part of Lear’s argument
hangs on establishing that virtuous activity is both intrinsically valuable and choice-worthy for the
sake of something even more valuable. Since virtues are middle-level ends—and thus intrinsically
valuable yet not that for the sake of which the best life is lived—agents who exercise the virtues do
so as an approximation of and ultimately for the sake of contemplation. In Lear’s words:
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The most fine uses of our practical reason occur in circumstances where there is a
challenge to overcome. By facing hardship in an orderly way, the virtuous person shows
there is something above his mere animal nature that makes his life worth living. But the
very fact that practical reason judges the challenges of war and political business worth
moving beyond suggests that such circumstances and the sort of virtuous activities that
only they make appropriate are not the ultimate value. (p. 187)
Virtue is worth choosing both for its own sake and because knowing the proper place of virtue in a
human life approximates contemplation. (p. 207)
Happy Lives and the Highest Good is worth reading for at least two reasons. First, the scholarship is
rigorous and thorough. Lear is careful to distinguish her interpretation of Aristotle from those she
rejects as well as those that are similar yet in subtle ways differ from her own. This feature of the
book should be especially appealing to Aristotle scholars. There is also a systematic attempt to
establish connections between the arguments in NE and the rest of Aristotle’s work. This feature of
the book should be especially appealing to those with some familiarity with NE yet less familiarity
with the rest of Aristotle’s work. Secondly, Lear’s argument in favor of the monistic conception of
happiness is compelling.
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